Medical Futility: A Futile Concept? by Shiner, Keith
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 2 Article 7
Spring 3-1-1996
Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?
Keith Shiner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keith Shiner, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 803 (1996),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol53/iss2/7
Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?
Keith Shiner*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................ 804
II. Amendments to Virginia and Maryland Health Care
Decisions Acts .............................. 809
III. Background Principles ......................... 811
A. Respect for Life .......................... 811
B. Patient Autonomy and the Right to Direct the Use or
Nonuse of Life-Prolonging Treatment ........... 812
IV. Futility Presented ............................ 816
A. Medical Conditions and Cases in Which Physicians
and Hospitals Have Attempted to Withdraw Life-
Sustaining Treatment Against Patients' Wishes ....... 816
1. Irreversible Unconsciousness ............... 816
a. Persistent Vegetative State: In re Wanglie ..... 817
b. Anencephaly: In re Baby K ............... 820
2. Severe Pain with No Chance of Recovery:
In re Jane Doe; Baby L; Baby Rena ........... 823
B. Defining Futility .......................... 826
1. Physiological or Quantitative Futility .......... 827
2. Qualitative Futility ...................... 830
3. Brain-Dead Patient as Paradigmatic Case
of Futility ............................ 832
C. An Argument for the Legal Recognition of Futility .... 834
1. Respect for the Ethical Integrity of the Medical
Profession Supports the Recognition of Futility .... 834
2. Respect for Patient Autonomy Does Not Undermine
Futility Because Autonomy Is a Negative Right
Instead of a Positive Right ................. 837
* I would like to thank Professor Ann Massie for her valuable assistance and
suggestions in the development of this Note. I would also like to thank my parents, Phil andLinda Shiner, fbr their unwavering support, guidance, and encouragement throughout my life.
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 803 (1996)
3. Potential Limits to Physician Authority to Declare
Treatment Futile ........................ 840
D. Policy Considerations ....................... 841
V. Recommendations for How the Legal System Should
Respond .................................. 843
VI. Conclusion ................................. 847
Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas*
I. Introduction
Are patients raging too much against the dying of the light? After
courts established patients' rights to withdraw life-sustaining treatment,1 are
patients2 now demanding continuation of inappropriate treatment that should
be withdrawn and forcing physicians to continue treatment that the physi-
cians consider unethical3 and medically futile? Several recent cases4 and
** DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, in THE POEMS OF
DYLAN THOMAS 207 (Daniel Jones ed., New Directions Publishing Corp. 1971) (1952).
1. Courts have established the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment based upon a
constitutional right of privacy, a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the common-law right to informed consent. The seminal case of In re Quinlan grounded
Karen Quinlan's right to refuse treatment in a federal constitutional privacy right. In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Subsequently,
most courts based the right to refuse treatment on the common-law right to informed consent,
either alone or in combination with the constitutional privacy right. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990).
2. The patients discussed in this Note are not competent and are unable to make
decisions for themselves because of their status on life support. The patient's surrogate
makes the life support decisions discussed in this Note instead of the patient. However,
because the patient's interests and life are at issue, this Note will refer to the "patient" as
decisionmaker. The analysis does not change by referring to the patient instead of the
surrogate.
3. Treatment can be considered "unethical" for several reasons. First, patients could
pursue treatment towards ends for which medical treatment should not be employed. Second,
the treatment could violate a particular physician's personal ethics. Third, the treatment
could not be the best use of society's scarce health care resources. This Note considers
unethical treatment primarily under the first and third conceptions. See infra notes 199-207
and accompanying text (discussing ways in which treatment can be considered unethical).
4. See infra notes 77-92, 98-140 and accompanying text (discussing futility cases).
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research s suggest that patients may be.
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court held in 1976 that Karen Ann
Quinlan's right to privacy included the right to have life-sustaining treatment
withdrawn,6 families, hospitals, physicians, and courts increasingly have
faced decisions concerning the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
treatment. Approximately eighty percent of the deaths each year in the
United States occur in hospitals or nursing facilities, and seventy percent of
these deaths result from decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment.7
Initially, physicians and hospitals resisted terminating treatment for patients
who were not brain dead, predominantly out of fear of criminal or civil
liability.8 Consequently, many individuals feared living - and dying - as
"prisoners" of life-sustaining technologies.9 The cause for these fears has
5. See generally Jeremiah Suhl, M.D. et al., Myth of Substituted Judgment: Surrogate
Decision Making Regarding Life Support is Unreliable, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 90
(1994) (examining agreement between patient responses to questionnaire for preferences for life
support treatment in four scenarios and substituted judgment of patient's surrogate). The
authors' coma scenario elicited preferences for resuscitation from 16% of the patients despite
a less than 1% chance of awakening. Id. at 92. Further, the authors found that surrogate
disagreement with patients' true preferences as expressed in the questionnaire was twice as
likely to favor life support that patients did not want than to favor less treatment than patients
wanted. Id. at 93-94. The authors cite another study finding that spouses also overestimated
patients' desires for life support. Id. at 94 (citing R.F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians and Spouses'
Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY 115 (1988)).
However, one recent study does suggest that physicians and surrogates are already acknowledg-
ing the futility of some treatments. See Joan M. Teno et al., Prognosis-Based Futility Guide-
lines: Does Anyone Win?, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1202, 1205-06 (1994) (suggesting
acknowledgment of futility by physicians and surrogates).
6. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.) (holding that Quinlan's right to
privacy included right to withdraw life support treatments and that her father may assert her
right to privacy in her behalf), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
7. See Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treatment on Grounds of Futility: A Role for Institutional
Policy, II ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 481, 493 (1992) (citing Helen B. Lipton, Ph.D., Do-Not-
Resuscitate Decisions in a Community Hospital: Incidence, Implications, and Outcomes, 256
JAMA 1164, 1168 (1986)). Justice Brennan cited similar figures in Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302-03 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983) (finding that doctor's
cessation of life-sustaining treatment upon family's request, though intentional and with
knowledge that patient would die, was not unlawful failure to perform legal duty); E. Haavi
Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 33, 33 (noting previous physician resistance to removing life-sustaining
treatment stemming from concerns over being sued or indicted for murder).
9. See B.D. COLEN, HARD CHOICES: MIXED BLESSINGS OF MODERN MEDICAL TECHNOL-
OGY 248 (1986) (noting public reaction to Quinlan case, in which woman lived in coma for more
than decade). "The thing the Quinlan case has done for most people is kind of set up a para-
digm . . . . People say, 'I don't want to die like Karen Ann Quinlan.'" Id. at 249 (quoting
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 803 (1996)
eased in the last twenty years, as courts and commentators have developed
a general consensus that patients have the right to terminate life-sustaining
treatment upon request.'" The proliferation of living will and surrogate
decisionmaking statutes affirms this consensus."
A "turf battle"' 2 has now developed and some physicians and commen-
tators believe that patient autonomy has gone too far and that patients and
their surrogates demand too much. They believe that patient autonomy has
intruded too far into physician integrity - both as a matter of professional
judgment and as a matter of professional ethics. Thus, in several recent
cases, physicians and hospitals have argued that certain treatments were
futile and have sought to remove or withhold life-sustaining treatment against
the wishes of surrogates. 3 These cases raise the issue of whether a physi-
cian's or hospital's determination that certain requested treatment is medi-
cally or ethically inappropriate should override the patient's demand for such
treatment. Although courts thus far have denied the physician and hospital
George Annas, professor of health law at Boston University's schools of medicine and public
health). Cf. Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D., The Futility Debate: Effective Versus
Beneficial Intervention, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 883, 886 (1994) (stating, in context of
argument that medicine's goal is to benefit patient, rather than merely to affect body, that
"[p]atients and families who demand that 'everything be done' may well be expressing a
subtext: 'Do not abandon me'").
10. The right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment originally grew out of the constitu-
tional right of privacy, but has since been stated more often in terms of a constitutional liberty
interest or in terms of an autonomy interest as developed in informed consent doctrine. See
infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text (discussing patient autonomy).
11. See Daniel R. Mordarski, Note, Medical Futility: Has Ending Life Support Become
the Next "Pro-Choice/Right o Life" Debate?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 751, 778 (1993) (noting
that every state and District of Columbia have legislation concerning individual's right to
accept or reject life-sustaining treatments and establishing procedures for surrogate decision-
makers); id. at 778 n.197 (compiling list of relevant state statutes).
12. See Joseph J. Fins, Futility in Clinical Practice: Report on a Congress of Clinical
Societies, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 861, 864 (1994) (stating that "[t]he debate over
futility has become, in essence, a question of turf"); Morreim, supra fiote 8, at 35-36 (arguing
that coercion, instead of futility, is central issue of debate).
13. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) (denying hospital's
request for order that it is not required to provide continued life-support to anencephalic
infant), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); In re Jane Doe, No.
D-93064 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County, Ga. Oct. 17, 1991) (denying hospital's request to allow
de-escalation of treatment for 13-year-old girl and entry of Do Not Resuscitate order without
consent of both parents), aft'd, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283
(Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991), reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 369
(1991) (denying hospital's request to appoint independent guardian and appointing husband
of 86-year-old woman in persistent vegetative state as guardian in her best interests to direct
life-sustaining treatment).
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requests in every case, the courts have focused on the question of who
should decide whether to continue treatment instead of addressing the futility
question.
Many commentators support the decisions in these cases and criticize
the idea of recognizing medically inappropriate, or futile, treatment that
physicians can withhold or withdraw against patients' wishes. These com-
mentators raise concerns such as whether futility arguments are really physi-
cians' attempts to regain power from patients,14 whether physicians will
remove patients or their surrogates from the decisionmaking process, 5 and
whether physicians will use the futility argument to deny treatment to certain
population groups.16  They also question the extent to which economic
concerns are motivating the futility debate 7 and the amount of money that
14. See Alexander M. Capron, In re Helga Wanglie, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-
Oct. 1991, at 26, 27-28 (discussing Wanglie case as it relates to power issue); Morreim,
supra note 8, at 35 (stating that practical moral dilemmas of futility debate concern coercion,
not futility or value of life).
15. See Capron, supra note 14, at 28. See generally Alexander M. Capron, Medical
Futility: Strike Two, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 42 [hereinafter Capron,
Medical Futility] (discussing futility after In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 91 (1994)). Indeed, the case of Catherine F. Gilgunn suggests that physicians have
already removed patients and their surrogates from the decisionmaking process. See gener-
ally Gina Kolata, Withholding Care from Patients: Boston Case Asks, Who Decides?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al (reporting suit against hospital and two physicians by daughter
of elderly woman after physicians allegedly entered Do Not Resuscitate order for elderly
woman, leading to woman's death, against wishes of guardian daughter). The jury verdict
in the Gilgunn case for the hospital and physicians may suggest that society is ready to accept
some notion of futility. See Alexander M. Capron, Abandoning a Waning Life, HAT iNGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1995, at 24 (reporting jury verdict for hospital and physicians in
Gilgunn suit and discussing significance of Gilgunn verdict). Further, a recent national
survey suggested that 80% of physicians surveyed had withdrawn care that they considered
futile, nearly one-quarter having acted without family consent, and 3 % having acted contrary
to family wishes for continued treatment. See Richard A. Knox, Suit Centers on Ethics of
Life Support; MGH, Physicians Named in Action, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1995, at 26
(discussing poll results in relation to Gilgunn case). The physician who conducted the survey
stated that "[w]hen you get patients to agree, there's so much subtle or not so subtle coercion
.... Patients are sold something. We all know doctors who are particularly good at quote
getting the [Do Not Resuscitate] order .... ." Kolata, supra, at Al.
16. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027 (suggesting that allowing futility exception to
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994), would
allow hospitals to deny emergency treatment to accident victims with terminal cancer or
AIDS); see also Erich H. Loewy, M.D. & Richard A. Carlson, M.D., Futility and Its Wider
Implications: A Concept in Need of Further Examination, 153 ARCHIES INTERNAL MED.
429, 430 (1993) (noting danger that futility poses to elderly, poor, or other relatively
powerless population groups).
17. See John D. Lantos, M.D., Futility Assessments and the Doctor-Patient Relation-
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the recognition of futility could save by eliminating needless, but expensive,
treatment from dying patients.1 8 Apparently acting contrary to the commen-
tators' criticism of futility, Virginia and Maryland recently amended their
health care decisions acts such that the acts do not require physicians to
provide treatment that the physicians determine to be medically or ethically
inappropriate. These states thus seem to acknowledge the validity of the
futility concept.' 9
Therefore, the time has come for the law to address the issue: Can a
physician refuse to provide life-sustaining treatment that the physician deems
medically inappropriate or futile against a patient's request that the treatment
continue?' For example, may a physician unilaterally withdraw life-sustain-
ing treatment from an elderly patient in a persistent vegetative state?2 May
a physician refuse on the grounds of futility to provide requested resuscita-
tion for an anencephalic baby?' Further, is it wise to allow physicians this
futility "trump card"? Or does respect for patient autonomy require physi-
cians to continue providing life support, despite the physicians' judgment
that the treatment is futile? These questions are important because they
address issues concerning the meaning that we attach to life, particularly
diminished life;' self-determination;24 the nature of the physician-patient
ship, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 868, 869 (1994) (noting physicians' interest in futility after
development of prospective payment systems and noting that although medical futility for
patients is not clearly definable, financially futile care for hospitals is clearly definable).
18. See Capron, Medical Futility, supra note 15, at 43 (discussing Baby K and status of
futility debate); Michael A. Rie, The Limits of a Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1991,'at 24, 26-27 (discussing economic conflicts that can arise in case like Wanglie); see gener-
ally Teno et al., supra note 5 (investigating potential savings from elimination of futile care).
19. See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (providing amendments and discussing
their provisions).
20. For a recent British case in which the Court of Appeal seemed to recognize a physi-
cian's authority to declare treatment futile, see Re J (a minor), [1992] 4 All E.R. 614 (C.A.),
in which the court held that it would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction over minors to order
a physician to provide life-sustaining treatment to a severely handicapped, microcephalic minor
in a manner contrary to the physician's clinical judgment of the minor's best interests.
21. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (discussing such case).
22. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing such case).
23. See generally COLEN, supra note 9 (1986) (discussing ethical problems created by
technology). Colen states:
Indeed, it is not at all uncommon when afn anencephalic baby] is born for the
physician to place the infant in a tray in a comer of the delivery room and simply
cover the tray with a towel and walk away. In a short time the infant is dead and the
parents are told that the mother delivered a stillborn, badly malformed infant.
Id. at 178.
24. See THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
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relationship;' and the just allocation of scarce health care resources.'
This Note considers the issue of medically futile treatment from several
perspectives. Part II introduces medical futility by discussing recent amend-
ments to the Virginia and Maryland health care decisions acts as legislative
responses to medical futility. Part 1H presents the background principles of
respect for life and patient autonomy and the right to direct the use or nonuse
of life-prolonging treatment upon which the futility debate lies. Part IV pre-
sents the various medical conditions and cases in which physicians and
hospitals have raised the futility issue and discusses various conceptions of
futility. It also presents an argument for the legal recognition of futility and
discusses the policy considerations germane to the futility debate. Finally,
Part V presents recommendations for how the legal system should respond,
arguing for a rejection of medical futility as a general concept, but arguing
for a limited, case-by-case recognition of physician authority to declare
treatments futile.
HI. Amendments to Virginia and Maryland Health Care Decisions Acts
At least two states, Virginia and Maryland, have attempted to address
the futility issue by amending their health care decisions acts.27 In 1992, the
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 19 (1987) (noting patients' rights to make important
decisions about their lives, including what happens to their bodies and use of life-sustaining
treatment).
25. See Edmund D. Pelligrino, M.D., Ethics, 270 JAMA 202, 203 (1993) (discussing
changes in physician-patient relationship). Pelligrino states that "[t]his issue must be con-
fronted as we enter more closely into managed health care systems in which cost containment,
allocation decisions, and societal benefit are reshaping the fiduciary relationship of physician
and patient." Id. Further, Pelligrino argues:
[The futility debate is] useful ... because it exposes the need for carefully weigh-
ing the limits of both physician and patient autonomy, the explicit meaning of "par-
ticipation," and the relative reliability and moral weight of "objective" medical and
"subjective" value determinations. Underlying these issues are deeper philosophical
questions about the nature of medical knowledge, the relationship between fact and
value, and the moral status of the physician's conscience in a pluralistic and
democratic society like ours, which so highly prizes individual autonomy.
Id.
26. See Daniel Callahan, Ph.D., Necessity, Futility, and the Good Society, 42 J. AM.
GERIATRiCS Soc'Y 866, 867 (1994) (discussing pressures of economic scarcity); Rie, supra
note 18, at 26-27 (discussing economic conflicts that can arise in futility cases).
27. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing that
ethically inappropriate or medically ineffective treatment is not required); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994) (providing that Health Care Decisions Act does not require
medically unnecessary treatment).
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Virginia General Assembly amended its Health Care Decisions Act (VA-
HCDA)' and affirmed that the right to request treatment does not create an
obligation for a physician to provide treatment that the physician deems
medically or ethically inappropriate. The amended VA-HCDA provides, in
Section 2990, that "[n]othing in this article shall be construed to require a
physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the
physician determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate."29
In 1993, Maryland amended its Health Care Decision Act (MD-HCDA)
to provide that the MD-HCDA requires the provision of neither ethically
inappropriate nor medically ineffective treatment.' The amended MD-
HCDA provides in Section 5-611:
(a) Ethically inappropriate treatment not required. - Except as provided in
section 5-613(a)(3) of this subtitle, nothing in this subtitle may be construed
to require a physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient
that the physician determines to be ethically inappropriate.
(b) Medically ineffective treatment not required. - (1) Except as provided
in § 5-613(a)(3) of this subtitle, nothing in this subtitle may be construed to
require a physician to prescribe or render medically ineffective treatment. 3'
Section 5-613(a)(3) requires a transferring provider to comply with a pa-
tient's treatment instructions pending a transfer of the patient to a health care
provider who will comply with the instructions willingly when failure to
comply with the instructions would likely result in the patient's death.' The
MD-HCDA defines medically ineffective treatment to mean that "to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, a medical procedure will not
(1) [p]revent or reduce the deterioration of the health of an individual; or
(2) [p]revent the impending death of an individual."
33
These legislative responses signal a willingness to deal with the problem
of medical futility. However, the legislative responses are incomplete. For
example, Virginia does not define "medically or ethically inappropriate"
treatment. Also, although both statutes provide for transfer of the patient
when physicians determine that requested treatment is inappropriate,34
neither statute provides for situations in which no transferee hospital is
28. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 1994).
29. Id. § 54.1-2990.
30. See MD. CODEANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing that
ethically inappropriate or medically ineffective treatment is not required).
31. Id. § 5-611(a), (b)(1).
32. Id. § 5-613(a)(3).
33. Id. § 5-601(n).
34. Id. § 5-613; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2987, -2990 (Michie 1994).
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willing to accept the patient and to provide the treatment deemed "medically
or ethically inappropriate." The MD-HCDA does provide that, pending
transfer, health care providers must comply with a patient's instructions
regarding treatment if failure to comply with the instruction would likely
result in the patient's death,3" but still avoids the situation in which a willing
transferee is not available. Finally, although the MD-HCDA acknowledges
the concept of medically ineffective treatment, the MD-HCDA does not
authorize action contrary to expressed wishes of the patient." The patient's
known wishes presumably include wishes expressed through surrogates.'
III. Background Principles
A. Respect for Life
A convincing argument that physicians should have the authority to
declare certain life-sustaining treatments futile must overcome a presumption
in favor of life because, in essence, the futility concept suggests that the law
should allow physicians to determine that some patients should die. Courts
have been reluctant to impose a "duty to die" on patients.38 Indeed, the
principal concern underlying and limiting the right of a patient to withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining treatment, particularly through a surrogate, is a
respect for life - both the sanctity of life in general and preservation of the
life of the particular patient.3 Thus, courts will err on the side of preserving
life.4" The Supreme Court grounded its holding that a state may require
clear and convincing proof of an incompetent individual's intent before a
surrogate may withdraw life-sustaining treatment on the state's interest in
35. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
36. See id. § 5-611(e)(2) (providing that "[niothing in this subtitle authorizes any action
with respect to medical treatment, if the health care provider is aware that the patient for
whom the health care is provided has expressed disagreement with the action").
37. See id. § 5-605 (providing for surrogate decisionmaking).
38. See In re Jane Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 21-22 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County, Ga.
Oct. 17, 1991) (stating that requiring removal of life-sustaining treatment from patients when
physicians decide there is no hope for "meaningful recovery" approaches imposing duty to
die on terminally ill patients - one duty that this society does not impose).
39. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-
27 (Mass. 1977) (identifying preservation of life and prevention of suicide as among four state
interests that could overcome patient's wish to withdraw life-sustaining treatment).
40. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (N.J. 1985) (stating that "[w]hen evidence
of a person's wishes or physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all,
in favor of preserving life"); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 273
(1990) (citing Conroy for same proposition).
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life.41 The Court recognized the presumption in favor of life by noting that
an incorrect decision not to end life merely preserves the status quo, allow-
ing for possible developments that may correct or ameliorate the effect of the
erroneous decision. 2 However, because an incorrect decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment results in death, it is impossible to correct the
decision or limit its effects.43
B. Patient Autonomy and the Right to Direct the Use
or Nonuse of Life-Prolonging Treatment
Although courts acknowledge the importance of life, they recognize that
a state's interest in life "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims," and a
patient's right to privacy and self-determination then prevails over the state's
interest in life.' Courts and legislatures have established that the patient,
rather than the physician, has the authority to decide the course of treatment
for that patient at the extremes of life.45 Courts and legislatures have placed
41. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-87.
42. Id. at 283.
43. Id.
44. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
45. In chronological order, the leading cases discussing the circumstances under which
a patient may refuse life-sustaining treatment that will not cure the patients underlying
condition include: In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.) (affirming privacy right to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431-32 (Mass. 1977) (applying
substituted judgment doctrine and finding that patient, if competent, would not want chemo-
therapy); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Mass. App. 1978) (declaring that law does
not require prior judicial approval in order to withdraw resuscitation in appropriate cases);
In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120, 122-23 (Mass. 1980) (finding that probate judge correctly
found that treatment should be withdrawn but disapproving of court's decision to delegate
decision concerning life-sustaining treatment to ward's wife and son when probate court had
found that ward would have refused such treatment if competent); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d
64, 70-73 (N.Y.) (approving, in one case of consolidated appeal, order to remove respirator
of incompetent patient because maintaining patient in vegetative coma by use of respirator
was inconsistent with patient's repeated, stated wishes while competent, but, in other case,
concluding that application for permission to continue transfusions for never-competent
patient should have been granted over surrogate's wishes that transfusions cease), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (concluding that doctor's cessation of life-sustaining treatment upon family's
request, though intentional and with knowledge that patient would die, was not unlawful
failure to perform legal duty); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that competent adult patients with incurable, but not terminal, illnesses
have right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment against physician's objections); In re Conroy,
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the decisionmaking authority with patients primarily out of respect for
autonomy or self-determination. Thus, an argument that physicians have the
authority to declare certain requested treatments futile must overcome
patients' autonomy rights as courts have developed them over the last twenty
years46 and demonstrate why physicians have a greater authority to decide
the use of care at the extremes of life.
A competent individual generally has the right to control what is done
with his or her body.' Courts base this right upon various grounds, but they
generally rely on either the common law of informed consent or on a consti-
tutional privacy right. The common law of informed consent generally
486 A.2d 1209, 1242-44 (N.J. 1985) (finding evidence insufficient - under subjective,
limited-objective, or pure-objective tests - to establish incompetent patient's wish to
terminate life-sustaining treatment); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that competent woman's right to refuse medical treatment
entitled her to removal of nasogastric feeding tube inserted against her will despite life-
sustaining nature of treatment and that hospital may not deny her relief from pain and
suffering because of her choice); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d
626, 639-40 (Mass. 1986) (upholding judgment honoring substituted judgment of patient
in persistent vegetative state to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration and, although
agreeing with hospital that hospital itself can refuse patient's request to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, ordering hospital to assist guardian in transferring patient to facility
that will withdraw treatment); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447-50 (N.J. 1987) (holding that,
under circumstances, nursing home could not refuse to participate in patient's withdrawal
of artificial nutrition by continuing to treat patient until patient was transferred); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (holding that Missouri could
require clear and convincing evidence of patient's intent to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment before surrogate could exercise authority to remove treatment). See George P.
Smith, 1I, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAViS L. Rv. 275, 384-408 (1988)
(characterizing these cases, except yet-to-be-decided Cruzan, as leading precedents and
discussing them at length).
46. See cases cited supra note 45 (providing leading end-of-life cases).
47. See Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating
that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages") (Cardozo, J.). Further, as
Cruzan's dissenting opinion explains:
It is 'a well-established rule of general law . . . that it is the patient, not the
physician, who ultimately decides if treatment - any treatment - is to be given
at all . . . . The rule has never been qualified in its application by either the
nature or purpose of the treatment, or the gravity of the consequences of acceding
to or foregoing it.'
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 306 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.C. 1985)).
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includes an individual's right to informed refusal of unwanted medical care,
4
8
including life-sustaining treatment. 9 Courts have also grounded the right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment upon constitutionally protected privacy5°
and liberty interests." However, courts have relied upon the constitutional
rationales less frequently in recent years and have generally grounded the
right to refuse treatment solely upon common-law informed consent or
informed consent in combination with a privacy right.'
Incompetent patients have the same rights to refuse unwanted medical
treatment as do competent patients. 3 Incompetent patients exercise those
rights either through some form of advance directive or other expression of
wishes,54 or through a surrogate.' Individuals may appoint their own
48. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 (stating "the common law doctrine of informed consent
is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment"); cases cited id. at 269-77.
49. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209, 224 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(considering whether competent patient has right to have life-support equipment disconnected
over objections of physicians despite fact that such removal will hasten death and finding that
patient's right to self-determination outweighs any state interests).
50. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that competent woman's right to refuse medical treatment as part of fundamental
privacy right entitled her to removal of nasogastric feeding tube inserted against her will
despite life-sustaining nature of treatment and holding that hospital may not deny her relief
from pain and suffering because of her choice); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.)
(holding that Karen Quinlan had constitutionally protected privacy right to remove respirator),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
51. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (stating that "[tihe principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 229
(1990) (recognizing liberty interest in refusing unwanted antipsychotic drugs); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (recognizing more general liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (same).
52. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (recognizing informed consent, alone or combined
with privacy right, as most frequent basis for courts upholding right to refuse treatment).
53. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 662-64 (analyzing comatose woman's right to privacy and
finding "only practical way" to prevent loss of right was to allow family to decide "whether
she would exercise it in these circumstances"); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990)
(holding that when pregnant woman is incompetent to give informed consent to medical
treatment, her decision must be ascertained through substituted judgment).
54. A patient can make a formal advance directive, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-
2981 to -2993 (Michie 1994), or a patient can express his or her wishes informally, see In re
Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (finding sufficient evidence of patient's wishes
to allow removal of respirator from prior expressions, which occurred during religious
group's discussion of Quinlan case, that favored nontreatment).
55. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2983 to -2984 (Michie 1994) (providing that individu-
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surrogates,56 or if an individual does not appoint a surrogate, a court may
appoint a surrogate - commonly a family member - for the individual.Y
For example, parents have a fundamental constitutional right to direct the
care of their children 8 and courts presume that parents generally, though not
always, act in the best interests of their minor children when making medical
decisions.59
Courts determine a surrogate's authority to exercise an incompetent
patient's rights on the basis of the evidence available concerning the now-
incompetent patients' wishes regarding treatment when formerly competent.
The deci-sionmaking process involves, first, making a substituted judgment
for the patient by deciding what the patient would have wanted - a surro-
gate may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment when it is clear that
the patient would have refused the treatment under the circumstances. 60
Courts use a second criterion to guide decisionmaking when some evidence
exists that the patient would have refused the treatment and the surrogate
decides that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatments
clearly outweigh the benefits of that life - the patient's best interests.6' The
best interests standard also guides surrogate decisionmaking in a third
situation - when no evidence exists of the patient's wishes, such as when
the patient has left no prior clues regarding the patient's wishes or when the
patient has always been incompetent. In such a case, a surrogate may direct
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if the surrogate
decides in the patient's best interests that the burdens of the patient's contin-
ued life with the treatments clearly outweigh the benefits of that life.62 States
als may appoint agent to make health care decisions in accordance with advance directive).
56. Id.
57. See id. § 54.1-2986 (providing following people as authorized decisionmakers, in
order of preference, in absence of advance directive expressing patient's wishes or naming
agent: guardian of patient, patient's spouse, adult child of patient, parent of patient, adult
sibling of patient, other relative of patient in descending order of blood relationship).
58. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (providing cardinal prin-
ciple that custody, care, and nurture of children reside primarily in parents).
59. See In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (recognizing that "natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children") (quoting Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
60. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (describing subjective test for terminating
life-sustaining treatment).
61. See id. at 1232 (describing limited-objective test, which combines patient's best
interests with some evidence of patient's wishes).
62. See id. (discussing pure-objective test and noting its propriety in instances when
"the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment [are] such
that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane").
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have also incorporated the best interests test into their health care decisions
acts to guide appointed surrogates in the absence of any evidence of the
patients' wishes, preferences, or beliefs. 63
IV. Futility Presented
A. Medical Conditions and Cases in Which Physicians and Hospitals
Have Attempted to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment
Against Patients' Wishes
Against the background of a respect for life and patient autonomy,
physicians have raised the notion of futility in medical conditions involving
irreversible unconsciousness, severe pain that physicians cannot alleviate, or
both. To understand physicians' calls for recognition of futility, one must
understand the medical conditions in which physicians consider treatment
futile. Several cases in recent years involved physicians' attempts to remove
life-sustaining treatment from patients in these medical conditions against the
wishes of those making decisions for the patients. While these cases likely
deviate from many other patient scenarios in which physicians and surrogates
come to consensus about the proper course of treatment or withdrawal of
treatment,' they nevertheless demonstrate the difficult questions and con-
flicting interests that arise when physicians and surrogates disagree over
whether particular treatment is worthwhile or effective at achieving appropri-
ate therapeutic goals.
1. Irreversible Unconsciousness
The conditions of "persistent vegetative state" (PVS) and anencephaly
present two common examples of irreversible unconsciousness that pose the
futility question.65 For example, the President's Commission for the Study
63. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(A) (Michie 1994) (providing decision
criteria for persons authorized to consent to provision, withholding, or withdrawal of
treatment in absence of advance directive). The decisionmakers authorized by § 2986 must
ascertain the religious beliefs and basic values of the patient and base their decisions on those
values unless the beliefs and values are unknown, in which case the decisionmakers must
decide based upon the patient's best interests. Id.
64. See Teno et al., supra note 5, at 1205-06 (providing evidence that physicians and
surrogates may already be reaching much agreement about withdrawing treatment or not
pursuing "futile" measures). But see The SUPPORT Principle Investigators, A Controlled
Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients, 274 JAMA 1591, 1596 (1995)
[hereinafter SUPPORT] (finding that enhanced opportunities for physician-patient communi-
cation did not change established physician practice patterns that included major shortcomings
in care of seriously ill, hospitalized patients).
65. See generally The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with Anen-
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of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(President's Commission) suggests that treatment may be futile in cases of
permanent unconsciousness because the treatment cannot confer the ordinary
benefits of medical treatment. 6 Thus far, however, courts have not recog-
nized as futile the treatment of patients in states of irreversible unconscious-
ness in the cases in which physicians have made futility claims.
a. Persistent Vegetative State: In re Wanglie
The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS67 (PVS Task Force) defines the
vegetative state as "a clinical condition of complete unawareness of the self
and the environment, accompanied by sleep-wake cycles with either com-
plete or partial preservation of hypothalamic and brain-stem autonomic
functions."68 The PVS Task Force characterized the distinguishing feature
of the vegetative state as a cyclic, irregular state of sleeping and waking with
no detectable expression of self-awareness, recognition of external stimuli,
cephaly, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 669 (1990) [hereinafter Anencephaly Task Force] (present-
ing consensus of medical views on anencephaly in fetuses and infants from organizations of
physicians caring for such patients and comparing anencephaly with persistent vegetative
state). Anencephaly is similar to the persistent vegetative state in that both conditions are
states of permanent unconsciousness including "a loss or absence of all cerebral cortical
function"; both involve reflexive responses to pain, presumably without suffering; and both
involve cycles of sleeping and waking. Id. at 672. Anencephaly differs from persistent
vegetative state in that anencephaly occurs at birth rather than developing over time or
resulting from trauma; clinicians can observe the extent of neurological damage more easily
in anencephaly and can diagnose anencephaly with more certainty than persistent vegetative
state; and patients in persistent vegetative state generally live much longer than anencephalic
infants. Id.
66. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL IsSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 181-82
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. The President's Commission states:
[Treatment ordinarily aims to benefit a patient through preserving life, relieving
pain and suffering, protecting against disability, and returning maximally effective
functioning. If a prognosis of permanent unconsciousness is correct, however,
continued treatment cannot confer such benefits. Pain and suffering are absent,
as are joy, satisfaction, and pleasure. Disability is total and no return to an even
minimal level of social or human functioning is possible.
Id. (quoted in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
67. See generally The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the
Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. pt. 1, at 1499, pt. 2, at 1572 (1994)
(summarizing current knowledge on medical aspects of persistent vegetative state).
68. Id. pt. 1, at 1500.
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or learned response.69  Because PVS, by definition, includes
unconsciousness, adult PVS patients cannot experience pain and suffering;"0
however, newborn PVS patients may have the potential to experience pain
and suffering because of their different pain responses.7 The diagnosis of
a persistent vegetative state requires the condition to last from at least a few
weeks to a month or more.' The prognosis of permanent vegetative state
results when the chances for recovery from the vegetative state become small
enough to consider the condition irreversible.73 The PVS Task Force reports
that the mortality rate for adults and children diagnosed with PVS is eighty-
two percent at three years and ninety-five percent at five years.74 Therapy
cannot reverse the persistent vegetative state.7' In 1990, the American Medi-
cal Association estimated that there were between 15,000 and 25,000 PVS
patients in the United States.76
In re Wanglie, 1 the first case to confront the issue of physicians seeking
withdrawal of futile care against a surrogate's wish, provides an example of
69. Id. The PVS Task Force also presented criteria for diagnosing the vegetative state:
(1) no evidence of awareness of self or environment and an inability to interact with
others; (2) no evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behav-
ioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli; (3) no evidence of
language comprehension or expression; (4) intermittent wakefulness manifested by
the presence of sleep-wake cycles; (5) sufficiently preserved hypothalamic and brain-
stem autonomic functions to permit survival with medical and nursing care;
(6) bowel and bladder incontinence; and (7) variably preserved cranial-nerve reflexes
(pupillary, oculocephalic, corneal, vestibulo-ocular, and gag) and spinal reflexes.
Id.
70. See id. pt. 2, at 1576 (distinguishing between responses to noxious stimuli and
conscious, self-aware perceptions of pain and suffering).
71. Id. at 1577.
72. Id. pt. 1, at 1501.
73. Id.
74. Id. pt. 2, at 1575.
75. Id. at 1577. The PVS Task Force identified four levels of treatment:
high-technology "rescue" treatments, such as mechanical ventilation, dialysis, and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation; medications and other commonly ordered treatments,
including antibiotics and supplemental oxygen; hydration and nutrition; and nursing
or home care to maintain personal dignity and hygiene.
Id.
76. Council on Scientific Affairs & Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Medi-
cal Ass'n, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support,
263 JAMA 426, 427 (1990).
77. No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991), reprinted in 7
IssuEs L. & MED. 369 (1991).
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the futility question in the context of PVS.78 The issue before the probate
court concerned who would serve Helga Wanglie's best interests as her
guardian - her husband, Oliver Wanglie, or a stranger nominated by the
hospital that was treating her.79 In December 1989, Helga Wanglie, an 86-
year-old woman in Minnesota, fractured her hip and was hospitalized. Mrs.
Wanglie later suffered a cardiorespiratory arrest and never regained
consciousness.8 She eventually became ventilator dependent and was fed by
intubation.8 ' Doctors diagnosed her as being in an irreversible persistent
vegetative state.' Physicians suggested withdrawing the life-sustaining
treatment because it was not benefitting Mrs. Wanglie."3 Mrs. Wanglie's
husband and children refused consent to withdrawal of the treatment.84 Mr.
Wanglie further stated that his wife had never expressed her preferences with
respect to life-sustaining treatment.s Thereafter, a new attending physician
confirmed the diagnosis of persistent vegetative state and concluded that the
respirator was "non-beneficial" because it could not heal her, palliate her
pain, or allow her to enjoy life. 6 He informed the family that he would no
longer continue the respirator treatment. 7
78. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991),
reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369, 372, 377 (1991) (concluding that best interests of
woman in persistent vegetative state required appointing her husband of fifty-three years as
her guardian). Although the Wanglie case is generally acknowledged as a futility case, the
court expressly stated in a memorandum attached to the opinion that "[nlo Court order to
continue or stop any medical treatment for Helga Wanglie has been made or requested at this
time." Id., reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 377. Nonetheless, the case exists because of
the conflict between the physicians and family over the effectiveness or futility of Mrs.
Wanglie's treatment.
79. Id., reprinted in 7 ISsuES L. & MED. at 376.
80. Id., reprinted in 7 ISsuES L. & MED. at 374.
81. Id., reprinted in 7 ISsuES L. & MED. at 374.
82. Id., reprinted in 7 ISsuES L. & MED. at 375.
83. Steven H. Miles, M.D., Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical
Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512, 513 (1991). Steven Miles served as the ethics
consultant for the hospital during the Wanglie case. Id. At the time of the hospital's request,
Mrs. Wanglie suffered from irreversible persistent vegetative state; aortic insufficiency
murmur; congestive heart failure; chronic, recurrent pneumonias secondary to underlying
lung disease, unconsciousness, and recumbency; bilateral atelectasis and calcified lung
disease; and irreversible, chronic respiratory insufficiency with dependence on mechanical
ventilation. Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuES L. & MED. at 375.
84. Miles, supra note 83, at 513.
85. Id.
86. Id. The physician did not characterize the ventilator as "futile" because it could
prolong her life. Id.
87. Id. The ethics consultant concurred. Id.
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After Mr. Wanglie refused proposals to transfer his wife or to seek a
court order mandating treatment, the hospital informed the family that the
hospital would seek court direction on whether the hospital must continue the
treatment.' From February to May 1991, the family tried unsuccessfully to
transfer Mrs. Wanglie.' 9 In May 1991, the hospital petitioned the court
seeking first, appointment of an independent conservator to determine
whether the ventilator was providing a benefit, and second, if the ventilator
was not providing a benefit, a hearing to decide whether the hospital was
required to continue providing the respirator.' Relying upon Minnesota
guardianship law, which requires appointment of the person who will act in
the best interests of the incapacitated person, the court found that the
evidence clearly and convincingly supported the conclusion that the
appointment of Mr. Wanglie as guardian of Mrs. Wanglie's person and
estate was in her best interests.9" Ironically, Mrs. Wanglie died three days
after the court entered its order; the family praised the medical care that
Mrs. Wanglie had received.'
b. Anencephaly: In re Baby K
Anencephaly is a congenital abnormality in which an infant lacks a




91. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991),
reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 369, 372, 377 (1991). The court found that Mrs. Wanglie
did not have a living will; Mrs. Wanglie shared devout religious beliefs with her husband of
53 years, Oliver Wanglie; Mr. Wanglie was the closest person to Mrs. Wanglie and was fully
capable of understanding her medical situation and needs; occasionally, Mrs. Wanglie
discussed with her husband and son the meaning of life and the use of life-sustaining
treatments, but no evidence suggested she ever contemplated her condition in a persistent
vegetative state or ventilator dependency. Id., reprinted in 7 ISES L. & MED. at 370-71.
92. Miles, supra note 83, at 513.
93. See Anencephaly Task Force, supra note 65, at 669 (presenting consensus of
medical views on anencephaly in fetuses and infants from organizations of physicians caring
for such patients). "Anencephaly is a congenital absence of a major portion of the brain,
skull, and scalp... [resulting in] a hemorrhagic, fibrotic mass of neurons and glia with no
functional cerebral cortex." Id. Clinicians can diagnose anencephaly
with virtual certainty when all the following criteria are met: (1) A large portion
of the skull is absent. (2) The scalp, which extends to the margin of the bone, is
absent over the skull defect. (3) Hemorrhagic, fibrotic tissue is exposed because
of defects in the skull and scalp. (4) Recognizable cerebral hemispheres are
absent.
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upon the extent of brain-stem damage, anencephalic infants may respond to
noxious stimuli, exhibit feeding and respiratory reflexes, and interact
through facial expressions and eye movements. 94 However, the Medical
Task Force on Anencephaly (Anencephaly Task Force) reports that
anencephalic infants presumably cannot suffer.9' Anencephalic infants
generally die within days of birth.' The Anencephaly Task Force estimates
that slightly over 1000 infants per year are born with anencephaly. 7
In re Baby K98 provides an example of the futility question in the con-
text of anencephaly. In Baby K, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia considered whether a hospital would violate
federal and state law by refusing to provide requested life-sustaining
treatment for an anencephalic infant that the hospital and its physicians
considered medically and ethically inappropriate. 9 The Baby K court also
considered whether the request for continued treatment by the infant's
mother was so unreasonable that it constituted abuse or neglect; if the
request constituted abuse or neglect, the court would not have to respect the
mother's constitutional and common-law rights to decide treatment for her
child and the hospital would not have to comply with the request. 100 Baby
K was born in October 1992 with anencephaly. The hospital initially
Id. at 670.
94. Id. at 671-72.
95. Id. at 672.
96. Id. at 671. The Anencephaly Task Force notes that three large surveys reported
survival beyond one week at 0%, 5%, and 9% and reports an outside survival limit of two
months according to the Task Force's diagnostic criteria. Id. (citations omitted). But see,
Marylou Tousignant & Bill Miller, Baby K's Mother Gives Her the Prayer That Many Deny
She Has, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al (reporting continued survival after two years of
anencephalic infant at issue in In re Baby K).
97. Anencephaly Task Force, supra note 65, at 671.
98. 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
99. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-30 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd., 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994). The court considered the hospital's requests
for declarations that its refusal to treat Baby K would not violate the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994) (EMTALA); Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Section 302 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12181, 12182 (1994) (ADA); the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Id. §§ 5101-5106, 5111-5113, 5115 (1994); and the
Virginia Medical Malpractice Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to 581.20 (Michie 1992
& Supp. 1995). Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026-30.
100. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030-31. If the court had found abuse or neglect, it could
have overcome the constitutional and common-law presumption that the mother should decide
Baby K's treatment. Id. at 1031.
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stabilized Baby K, and Baby K's physicians advised Ms. H (Baby K's
mother) of the infant's diagnosis and prognosis.' The physicians
recommended providing only supportive care of warmth, nutrition, and
hydration and entering a "Do Not Resuscitate Order,"" but Ms. H insisted
on mechanical breathing assistance for Baby K. Believing that such care was
medically and ethically inappropriate, the hospital attempted to transfer Baby
K, but no other hospital would accept her. °3 The hospital subsequently
stabilized Baby K and transferred her to a nursing home, after which the
hospital readmitted Baby K three times between January and March of 1993
for respiratory failure, each time stabilizing her and returning her to the
nursing home.""4
After Baby K's second re-admission, the hospital brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine whether the hospital was required to continue
providing emergency medical treatment that it deemed medically and
ethically inappropriate."15 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia denied the hospital's requests for declaratory
judgments." Relying on the mother's constitutional and common-law rights
as a parent to make medical decisions for Baby K, and the presumption in
favor of life, the court found the mother to be the appropriate decisionmaker
for Baby K's treatments." The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision by finding that the plain language of the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act required the hospital to treat Baby K."10
101. See id. at 1025.
102. Id. A "Do Not Resuscitate Order" is a signed order directing that CPR not be
performed in case of cardiac or respiratory arrest. THE HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 24,
at 140.
103. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-30 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994). The district court relied upon the plain
language of EMTALA to decide that EMTALA "does not admit of any 'futility' or
'inhumanity' exceptions." Id. at 1027. The district court found that Baby K's anencephaly
qualified the infant for protection under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Id. at
1027-29. The district court did not consider the hospital's argument under the Child Abuse
Amendments because the hospital failed to join a necessary party, nor did it consider the
hospital's argument under the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act because Virginia courts have
not yet addressed the appropriate standard of care for anencephalic infants. Id. at 1029-30.
107. Id. at 1030-31.
108. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
Finding that Congress rejected a case-by-case approach to determining what emergency
treatment hospitals must provide and to whom, and relying upon the plain language of
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2. Severe Pain with No Chance of Recovery: In re Jane Doe;
Baby L; Baby Rena
Physicians have also raised the notion of futile treatment in instances in
which they have treated patients who experienced severe pain with no chance
of recovery. For example, in In re Jane Doe,1" the court considered the
case of Jane Doe, a thirteen-year-old girl in an "irreversible" condition with
no hope of "meaningful recovery" whose parents disagreed as to whether to
de-escalate her treatment or to enter a Do Not Resuscitate order.10 One of
Jane Doe's physicians described the lack of hope as meaning that the girl
may recover enough to respond only to deep pain, but not beyond that."1
Jane Doe had no self-awareness or capacity to relate to others.11 2 One
physician testified that the treatments used to sustain Jane Doe's life
themselves might have caused her pain.' Another of her physicians
concluded that continued treatment would be "abusive and inhumane."'14
Despite the physicians' claims, the court found no evidence of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment. 15 The court acknowledged that a move away from
a "paternalistic view of what is 'best' for a patient" and toward the principle
of individual autonomy undermined the hospital's authority to decide
treatment for patients and supported the parents' authority. 6 "[A]bsent
severe neglect, abuse or a stance that clearly endangers the child," the
parents had the authority to decide treatment.1 7 The court relied on the
EMTALA, the Fourth Circuit found no exception to EMTALA's duties to provide emergency
treatment when physicians determine that the treatment is futile. Id. at 592-98. Senior
Circuit Judge Sprouse dissented on the grounds that Congress did not intend for EMTALA
to apply as the majority applied it to the case and endorsed a case-by-case approach of
applying state malpractice law as the proper method for determining the appropriate care in
situations such as Baby K's. Id. at 598-99.
109. No. D-93064 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County, Ga. Oct. 17, 1991), af'd, 418 S.E.2d 3
(Ga. 1992).
110. In re Jane Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 2-3, 7, 9 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County, Ga.
Oct. 17, 1991), aft'd, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992). The court identified three competing
interests: the fundamental rights of each of the parents, the responsibilities of the state, and
the best interests of the child. Id. at 9.
111. Id.at3n.1.
112. Id. at4.
113. Id. However, another physician testified that she was not conscious of any pain or
suffering. Id. at 5.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 15-16.
117. Id. at 19.
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fundamental right of parents to direct medical treatment for their children
and on the presumption in favor of life in its ruling that the hospital could
not de-escalate Jane Doe's treatment or implement the Do Not Resuscitate
order absent the consent of both parents.118
In 1990 the New England Journal of Medicine reported what the authors
called the first physician refusal of "potentially life-prolonging medical treat-
ment for a patient in acute crisis." ' Baby L was born prematurely after a
complicated pregnancy; physicians resuscitated her and weaned her from
mechanical ventilation, but her "extensive neurological deficits" did not
improve, and she responded only to pain."2 Over the next twenty-four
months, physicians performed three major operations on Baby L, including
a gastrostomy and tracheostomy, and repeatedly hospitalized Baby L for
recurrent pneumonia, septic shock, and cardiopulmonary arrests.' Baby
L's mother continually insisted that everything possible be done to save
Baby L.22' The hospital physicians, nurses, ethics committee members, and
counsel met and unanimously agreed that further medical intervention was
not in Baby L's best interests because intervention would only inflict pain on
the child without improving the possible outcome.'I The mother rejected
the proposal and contacted an attorney who arranged a hearing in probate
court. 1 A pediatric neurologist contacted by Baby L's guardian ad litem
agreed that Baby L was severely ill and capable of experiencing pain and that
it was questionable whether she would survive even with full intervention."
Nevertheless, the consultant agreed to accommodate the mother's wishes and
Baby L was transferred to the consultant's care, rendering the legal dispute
moot. 126
118. Id. at 12-19. The court also recognized several other factors that weighed in the
court's decision of Jane Doe's best interests: the father's freedom of religion, the "devastating
effects" on the family of an order to terminate life support, and a reluctance to impose a "duty
to die" on Jane Doe. Id. at 20-22.
119. See John J. Paris, S.J., Ph.D. et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment:
The Case of Baby L, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1013 (1990).
120. Id. at 1012-13.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1013.
123. Id.
124. Id. In response to questioning from the judge, the attorney for the physicians
indicated that the physicians would not follow a court order to continue mechanical ventilation
because the physicians felt that it would violate their ethical obligations to Baby L. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Baby L was still alive two years after the reported incidents, but remained deaf,
blind, and quadriplegic. Id. She is fed through the gastrostomy, averages a seizure a day,
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The case of Baby Rena provides perhaps the most compelling example
of physicians' calls for withdrawing futile treatment because of the severe
pain it imposes."z Baby Rena was born on October 10, 1989, at George
Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C., weighing just four
pounds and twelve ounces; she was infected with HIV, the virus that causes
AIDS."2 Her mother abandoned her, but a hospital employee and his wife
soon "adopted" Baby Rena and became her volunteer foster parents,
allowing the District of Columbia to continue acting as Baby Rena's legal
guardian. 9 Physicians eventually placed Baby Rena on a respirator and
diagnosed her with pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, a leading complication
caused by AIDS."3 Baby Rena's condition gradually improved enough for
physicians to remove her from the respirator, artificial feeding, and most of
her medications, and she left the hospital at nine months of age.131
However, Baby Rena suffered cardiac failure with respiratory distress in
January 1991, and physicians placed her back on the respirator. 2 In
February, a new physician took over Baby Rena's care and concluded, after
several failed therapies, that she could survive on the respirator, but would
never improve.13
Thereafter, the physician and foster parents met with the ethics
committee several times to discuss the option of withdrawing treatment from
Baby Rena. The physician described Baby Rena's hopeless condition and
explained that she would die soon, but the foster parents, hoping for a
miracle, insisted on continuing the life-sustaining care and resuscitation."34
Baby Rena was in constant pain and anguish. The physicians continually
increased her medication to keep her sedated and free from agitation; she
requires sixteen hours of daily intensive home nursing, and retains the mental status of a
three-month-old. Id.
127. See generally Benjamin Weiser, The Case of Baby Rena: Who Decides When Care
Is Futile?, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, pt. 1, at Al, July 15, 1991, pt. 2, at Al (describing
life and treatment of baby girl with IV).
128. Id. pt. 1, atAl8.
129. Id. Thus, the volunteer foster parents had no legal standing. Id. pt. 2, at Al.
130. Id. pt. 1, at Al8.
131. Id. at A19.
132. Id.
133. Id. The physician stated that Baby Rena's situation was "different than just the loss
of personhood, which is the usual dilemma of someone in a persistent vegetative state. This
child was suffering, and she was suffering for a cause that we felt we couldn't fulfill." Id.
134. Id. The District of Columbia, which had become Baby Rena's guardian when her
mother abandoned her at birth, also refused permission to withdraw the respirator. Id. pt.
2, at Al.
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was fed intravenously; attempts to wean her from the respirator had failed;
and she suffered from chronic diarrhea. 135 One physician suggested that the
physicians unilaterally withdraw the care. 136 The foster parents eventually
agreed to attempt weanings, but insisted upon replacement of the respirator
should the weanings fail; several weanings succeeded for only a couple of
days before Baby Rena again required the respirator. 37 On March 25, 1991,
the physicians determined that Baby Rena would die imminently from
multiple organ system failure initiated by AIDS and recommended no further
interventions.138 The foster parents again rejected the prognosis and left the
hospital thinking that Baby Rena's condition would improve.'39 Baby Rena
died later that afternoon. 140
B. Defining Futility
Commentators have provided many definitions of "futile" care, but have
not produced a common conception. 141 The conceptions that they have
produced may not be sufficiently precise for a legal definition. In particular,
the probabilistic nature of medicine and the value judgments inherent in eval-
uating any probability create problems and confusion. 42
One must define futility in terms of the futility of achieving specific
ends. 43  Thus, one must first distinguish between "medical futility" -
whether the benefit of the treatment is worthwhile to the individual'" - and
"economic futility," or rationing - whether the benefit is worthwhile to




139. Id. at A6, A7.
140. Id. at A7.
141. See infra notes 143-87 and accompanying text (discussing futility definitions).
142. Compare Robert D. Truog, M.D. et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992) (arguing that physiological futility is at least close to being value
free) with Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 883 (asserting that limited goal of providing
physiological effects is value choice that radically changes nature of patient-centered ethic of
medicine).
143. See Stell, supra note 7, at 490 (defining futility as "end-related concept"); see also
Truog et al., supra note 142, at 1561 (noting that one must ask "Futile in relation to what?"
when discussing futility).
144. But see Loewy & Carlson, supra note 16, at 429-30 (noting that treatment may be
futile for patient but have social value to family, and approving of extension of treatment for
reasonable time to allow family and others concerned to come to terms with situation, provided
treatment causes patient no suffering).
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society.145 One author has also described "financial futility" in reference to
care or cases in which hospitals are reasonably assured of losing money
under operative prospective payment systems.1" Although this Note
concerns only individual situations and the issue of whether physicians may
decide that care is futile for a particular patient, the larger social problems
involving rationing and a just allocation of resources ultimately affect the
futility debate. 147
One can consider two broad conceptions of futility: (1) care that
produces no effect (physiological or quantitative futility), and (2) care that
produces an effect, but offers no benefit (qualitative futility).148  The
discussion below provides an example of each of the categories of futility
and evaluates whether the conception can provide a sufficient basis for a
legal recognition of futility. A new definition of death that includes
permanent unconsciousness, although not precisely a futility concept, also
could help resolve some aspects of the futility debate.
1. Physiological or Quantitative Futility
The first broad conception of futility includes what Robert Veatch and
Carol Spicer, two medical ethicists at Georgetown University's Kennedy
Institute of Ethics, refer to as care that produces no physiological effect at
a given level of probability."4 Allowing for a given level of probability that
a given treatment will produce a therapeutic benefit recognizes the inherent
145. See Nancy S. Jecker, Ph.D. & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D., Futility and
Rationing, 92 AM. J. MED. 189, 192-94 (1992) (discussing differences between concepts of
futility and rationing and noting that futility refers to "specific cause-and-effect relationship[s]"
while rationing refers to distributive choices); see also Stuart J. Younger, M.D., Who Defines
Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094, 2095 (1988) (noting that, until social consensus occurs, individual
physicians must distinguish between concerns for patients and more global economic and policy
concerns).
146. See Lantos, supra note 17, at 869 (discussing links between prospective payment
systems and futility debate and citing four studies demonstrating scenarios generating net
losses for hospitals under prospective payment systems).
147. See Callahan, supra note 26, at 867 (discussing pressures of economic scarcity);
Rie, supra note 18, at 26-27 (noting economic concerns in case of Helga Wanglie); see
generally Teno et al., supra note 5 (investigating potential savings from elimination of futile
care).
148. See Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 884-85 (discussing conceptions of futility);
Robert M. Veatch, Why Physicians Cannot Determine If Care Is Futile, 42 J. AM.
GERIATRIcs Soc'Y 871, 871 (1994) (distinguishing between two types of futility).
149. See Robert M. Veatch, Ph.D. & Carol M. Spicer, M.A., Medically Futile Care:
The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 16-20 (1992) (discussing
futility of care that produces no effect at chosen level of probability).
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uncertainty resulting from the empirical nature of medical practice."5 Other
commentators sometimes refer to this broad category as "physiological
futility"'5 1 or "quantitative futility." 15 Veatch and Spicer provide as an
example of this type of futile care cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
performed on a patient who last breathed three hours prior to administering
the care. 53 They cite the use of antibiotics for the common cold as another
example of this type of physiological futility."5 Lawrence Schneiderman and
his colleagues, leading physician commentators in the futility debate, 55 have
proposed as a definition of futility that if a treatment has proved ineffective
in the last one hundred cases, it is futile. " Schneiderman and his colleagues
use the outcomes from the last one hundred cases as a method of measuring
the probability of success in the next case."s Schneiderman defines
ineffective treatment as "treatment that merely preserves permanent
unconsciousness or that fails to end total dependence on intensive medical
care. "158
150. See Nancy S. Jecker, Ph.D. & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D., An Ethical Anal-
ysis of the Use of 'Futility' in the 1992 American Heart Association Guidelines for
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 2195, 2197 (recognizing quantitative component of futility).
151. See Younger, supra note 145, at 2094 (1988) (arguing that physicians should not
offer physiologically futile care).
152. See Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 884 (discussing quantitative futility).
153. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 18.
154. Id. (citing Tom Tomlinson, Ph.D. & Howard Brody, M.D., Ph.D., Futility and the
Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276, 1277 (1990)).
155. See generally Jecker & Schneiderman, supra note 145 (comparing and contrasting
different concepts of futility and rationing); Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D. & Nancy S.
Jecker, Ph.D., Futility in Practice, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 437 (1993) (discussing
how to define futility); Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D. et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning
and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949 (1990) (proposing that if care is
ineffective in last 100 cases, it is futile).
156. See Schneiderman et al., supra note 155, at 951 (proposing conception of futility).
The authors state that "when physicians conclude (either through personal experience,
experiences shared with colleagues, or consideration of reported empiric data) that in the last
100 cases a medical treatment has been useless, they should regard that treatment as futile."
Id.
157. See Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 884 (noting that if care did not work in previous
100 cases, it is almost certain to fail if tried again). Schneiderman acknowledges that society
or the medical community could fix the probability of success higher or lower than the level
suggested by his last-100-cases test, but asserts that the probabilistic nature of medicine
requires fixing some probability level where absolute certainty is impossible. Id.
158. Schneiderman et al., supra note 155, at 952.
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Those who support physiological futility would allow physicians to*
withhold or withdraw care that physicians determine is physiologically futile;
for example, Veatch and Spicer acknowledge, at least as a strong
presumption, that physicians can determine instances in which care will have
no effect and in which physicians, therefore, can refuse to provide such
procedures.' 59 Schneiderman similarly would allow physicians to refuse to
provide treatment under circumstances of quantitative futility."° In a report
on the ethics of providing life-sustaining treatment, the Hastings Center, a
leading bioethics institution, also suggests that physicians may refuse to
provide physiologically futile care.'
Some commentators argue that physiological futility presents a value-
free concept." That is, the question of what care is effective for achieving
a given physiological result is largely a question of medical science and
judgment.1 However, commentators such as Schneiderman dispute the
notion that physiologic futility is value free: They note that medicine's
objectives extend beyond producing physiologic effects to include healing the
person.'64
This conception of futility is not controversial; most commentators
would not require physicians to provide care that is physiologically or
quantitatively futile." However, this conception of futility is of limited use
159. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 19-20.
160. See Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 884 (suggesting that physicians' obligations do
not require offering quantitatively futile treatment).
161. See THE HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 24, at 19 (stating that physicians may
provide futile treatment, particularly when it offers psychological benefit, but noting that
there is no obligation to provide futile treatment).
162. See Truog et al., supra note 142, at 1561 (arguing that physiological futility is at
least close to being value free). But see Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 18-20 (arguing
that fact/value distinction is not always clear and that physiological futility thus presents
questions of values).
163. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 18 (noting that question concerns whether
treatment will produce relevant effects).
164. See Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D. et al., Beyond Futility to an Ethic of Care,
96 AM. J. MED. 110, 112 (1994) (stating that "[t]he objective of medicine is not to achieve
a simple physiologic effect. . ., but to heal ('make whole') the patient"). Schneiderman has
asserted elsewhere that assigning medicine the limited goal of producing physiological effects
on organ systems, instead of healing the whole patient, is itself a value choice that radically
changes the patient-centered nature of medicine. Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 883.
165. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 20 (noting that few people would question
physicians' ability to refuse to provide such treatments). Physiological futility is controversial
only to the extent that some people would limit the scope of physician authority to
physiological futility, but others would extend the authority beyond that.
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beyond recognizing a limited area of professional judgment. For example,
Veatch and Spicer note that Helga Wanglie's husband and physicians
disputed the benefit of her treatments, not the effects of those treatments. 66
Thus, this notion of futility would have been of little use to the court in
deciding the fate of Helga Wanglie. 67 Also, courts in the recent futility
cases, thus far, have not considered the fact that other practitioners agreed
with the physicians who sought to end treatment that the requested care was
futile, 68 perhaps because the treatment was effective at sustaining life. That
is, the real futility question in the cases concerned the benefit of the effects
created by sustaining life, instead of a medical judgment about whether the
treatments could effectively sustain life.
2. Qualitative Futility
The second broad conception of futility - qualitative futility -
concerns care that produces effects that physicians perceive to be of no
benefit. 16 9 Futility in this sense is at the heart of the futility debate because
it conflicts directly with the established notion of patient autonomy: It allows
physicians to determine the benefits of a particular treatment and to evaluate
those benefits for the patient. However, some physicians argue that
physicians should have this authority as a matter of professional judgment
falling within medicine's directive to act in the patient's best interests. 70 For
example, the medical effects of providing Helga Wanglie with a respirator
were not disputed - the respirator maintained her in a vegetative state;'
Baby K's emergency care had the effect of prolonging her life;' 72 and Baby
Rena's care similarly had the effect of prolonging her life.' Despite the
166. See id. at 21 (noting that Wanglie dispute did not concern medical facts, but rather
concerned value of preserving Helga Wanglie in vegetative state).
167. See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (discussing Wanglie).
168. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir.) (noting that no other facility would
accept Baby K - arguably representing consensus by medical community that care was futile
- yet declining to order that treatment was not required), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
169. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 16.
170. See generally Howard Brody, M.D., Ph.D., The Physician's Role in Determining
Futility, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 875 (1994) (arguing for expanded physician role in
determining futility).
171. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 21 (noting that dispute concerned value of
preserving vegetative life and did not concern medical facts); supra notes 77-92 and
accompanying text (discussing Wanglie).
172. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing Baby K).
173. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text (discussing case of Baby Rena).
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undisputed effects of treatment in these cases, physicians claimed that the
treatments were futile because the physicians perceived the effects to be of
no benefit.
Schneiderman provides as an example of qualitative futility the case in
which the best outcome resulting from care is that the patient will be kept
"perpetually prisoner in the Intensive Care Unit." 74 Schneiderman regards
such an outcome as a "failure to achieve the goals of medicine. ", Thus, he
assigns to the medical profession part of the responsibility for determining
the benefits of treatment and frames the qualitative futility issue in terms of
a question concerning the proper role of medicine. He considers a denial of
physician authority to declare certain treatments futile a radical change in the
nature of medicine, reducing physicians to mere technicians whose only
function is to provide any treatment that produces an effect that the patient
considers a benefit. 176
Lance Stell, a professor of clinical ethics at Carolinas Medical Center
in Charlotte, North Carolina, provides another example of this type of
futility."7 He discusses futility in terms of "nested" ends for diagnostic and
therapeutic efforts. 178 Patients value certain preliminary ends of treatment
only because they promote more advanced ends. When the treatment cannot
achieve the higher ends, the preliminary ends lose their value. 179  For
example, although CPR may achieve a limited end of restoring heart and
lung function, patients and physicians should devalue this limited end when
the chances of a fuller recovery diminish. Thus, physicians need not
perform CPR when the chances of fuller recovery are diminished because the
CPR is futile at achieving the greater end of recovery."
174. Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 885.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 883 (stating that "specify[ing] narrow physiological objectives as the goals of
medical practice is not value neutral, but a value choice that is, in my opinion, about as far
from the patient-centered tradition of the medical profession as it is possible to be").
177. See Stell, supra note 7, at 490-91 (discussing futility as "end-related concept").
178. See id. (noting relationship between means chosen and likelihood of achieving ends
desired in determining value of means).
179. See id. at 491 ("Lower-order ends are worthwhile in so far as they promote higher-
order or ultimate ends. When higher-order ends cannot be achieved, their subordinate ends
lose status as ends unless other suitably related higher-order ends are substituted.").
180. Id; see also John J. Paris, S.1., Ph.D. et al., Beyond Autonomy - Physicians'
Refusal to Use Life-Prolonging Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation, 329 NEW ENG. I.
MED. 354 (1993) (discussing futility in context of change in treatment goals after initial trial
therapy proves ineffective).
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Others, however, insist that questions about the benefits that certain
treatments provide are the province of patients and their families or
surrogates who have knowledge of the patients' values.1 81 Thus, they
contend that "the important category of 'care that produces an effect, but one
believed to be of no benefit,' should not be referred to as futile on medical
grounds. '" They contend that futility in this sense involves value
judgments concerning the benefits of treatment, for which the physician has
no particular skill. " Accordingly, these commentators argue that physicians
should not have the authority to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining
treatment against a patient's direction. 1" The effect-but-no-benefit
conception also requires evaluation of a patient's quality of life, a task that
courts have avoided. " To date, courts have respected the move away from
paternalistic standards under which physicians could determine the benefits
of treatments and toward the principle of individual autonomy,"M thus
agreeing with these latter commentators. 187
3. Brain-Dead Patient as Paradigmatic Case of Futility
David Blake, a lawyer and professor of philosophy, discusses futility by
positing the brain-dead patient as the "paradigmatic" case of futility. " He
suggests evaluating new cases for probable futility by examining how closely
181. See James L. Nelson, Families and Futility, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 879, 880
(1994) (discussing authority of family).
182. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 16-17.
183. See id. (arguing that futility judgments cannot properly be made solely by
physicians, particularly when treatment produces physiological effects).
184. Id. at 17.
185. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (noting
that states may properly decline to judge quality of life of particular individual).
186. See In re Jane Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 15-16 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County, Ga.
Oct. 17, 1991), aff'd, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992) (noting move away from paternalistic
standards and toward individual autonomy).
187. See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (discussing Wanglie case, in which
court denied hospital's request to appoint guardian for purpose of withdrawing allegedly futile
treatment and instead appointed woman's husband as guardian); supra notes 98-108 and
accompanying text (discussing Baby K case, in which court refused to allow hospital's
determination of futility to justify withdrawal of care); supra notes 109-18 and accompanying
text (discussing Jane Doe case, in which court refused to allow entry of Do Not Resuscitate
order against wishes of minor's parent).
188. See David C. Blake, Bioethics and the Law: The Case of Helga Wanglie: A Clash
at the Bedside - Medically Futile Treatment v. Patient Autonomy, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 119,
126 (1993) (noting that "medical intervention .... in this society, is most obviously and
consistently viewed as 'futile' . . . [in] the case of the brain-dead patient").
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they resemble the circumstances of the brain-dead patient." 9 Thus, a redef-
inition of brain-death to include permanent unconsciousness would place
patients in a persistent vegetative state and infants with anencephaly within
Blake's paradigmatic case of futility."9
The currently accepted standard for defining death is the "brain death"
standard,'91 which requires the loss of all brain functions." Some authors
have proposed new definitions of death based upon the permanent loss of
only higher brain functions - a definition that would include persistent
vegetative state and Anencephaly. 93 Those calling for such a change in the
definition of death base their proposals on their assertion that "[t]he death of
the higher brain is the death of what makes us human."194 Many of the
situations in which the question of futility arises concern patients in a persis-
tent vegetative state. 195 Because a dead person has no right to treatment,
such a change in definition would resolve some of the debate, at least in
cases involving patients in persistent vegetative states or patients with
189. Id. at 127. Blake proposes four categories for comparison: (1) the neurological and
other life functions of the patient; (2) the degree of inevitability and timing between the
patient's condition and cessation of all biological functions; (3) the patient's self-understand-
ing of the condition; and (4) the position of the treatment within the overall health care
picture. Id.
190. See supra notes 65-76, 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing persistent vegeta-
tive state and anencephaly and noting that both conditions involve permanent unconscious-
ness).
191. See Robert M. Veatch, Ph.D., The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain
Definition of Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1993, at 18, 18.
192. See UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 441, 443 (Supp.
1995). The Uniform Act provides: "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made
in accordance with accepted medical standards." Id. Thirty-one states, the District of Colum-
bia, and the Virgin Islands have adopted the Act. Id. at 441.
193. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, Ph.D., Pursuing a Peaceful Death, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., July-Aug., 1993, at 33, 37 (stating that "we must have a general social agreement on the
right of physicians to withhold medical treatment from persons in the persistent vegetative
state"); Veatch, Ph.D., supra note 191, at 23 (proposing that "[a]n individual who has sustained
irreversible loss of consciousness is dead"); Gina Kolata, Ethicists Debate New Definition of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at C13 (discussing proposed new definitions of death).
194. Kolata, supra note 193, at C13 (quoting Dr. John Fletcher, ethicist at University
of Virginia).
195. For example, Helga Wanglie was in a persistent vegetative state. In re Wanglie,
No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991), reprinted in 7 IssuEs L.
& MED. 369, 375 (1991).
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anencephaly. " However, because society is not yet ready to declare that
people with beating hearts and open eyes are dead,"9 a change in the defini-
tion of death is not imminent,' 98 which leaves the futility question in place,
at least for the time being.
C. An Argument for the Legal Recognition of Futility
1. Respect for the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
Supports the Recognition of Futility
Maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession is one of the
principal considerations involved in decisions regarding the use of life-
sustaining treatment.199 Requiring physicians to provide certain treatment
can violate the ethical integrity of the medical profession and the integrity of
the profession's judgments in several ways. First, patients could pursue
treatment toward ends for which medical treatment should not be employed.
Schneiderman. has argued that such an ethical violation occurs when
medicine is used merely to sustain biological functions instead of healing the
patient." A patient's request for treatment that a physician considers to be
medically inappropriate and a court requiring the physician to honor that
request also undermine the integrity of the medical profession's judgments. 20'
196. See Blake, supra note 188, at 127 (suggesting that legal definition of death "is in
effect a strong and persistent consensus regarding futile medical treatment").
197. See Kolata, supra note 193, at C13 ("It is pretty horrifying and psychologically
jarring, to say the least, to look at someone whose eyes are open and say they are dead.")
(quoting Dr. Ronald Cranford, neurologist and chair of ethics committee of American
Academy of Neurology).
198. See id. (noting fears of (1) declaring individuals with diminished mental capacities
dead and (2) diagnosing persistent vegetative state inaccurately).
199. See THE HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 24, at 19-20 (identifying ethical integrity
of health care professionals as underlying ethical value in decisions about use of life-
sustaining treatment).
200. See Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 883 (arguing that pursuit of narrow
physiological goals is not value neutral).
201. Medical societies generally justify the physician's authority to declare treatment
futile based upon some notion of a physician's judgment to determine "medically indicated"
treatments. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Medical Ass'n, Fundamental
Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship, 264 JAMA 3133, 3133 (1990) (noting
physician obligation to cooperate in provision of medically indicated treatments); see also
James J. Murphy, Comment, Beyond Autonomy: Judicial Restraint and the Legal Limits
Necessary to Uphold the Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the
Medical Profession, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 451, 467-70 (1993) (discussing
various medical associations' views of physician's role in determining appropriate treatment).
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Physicians contend that they have an obligation to exercise learned judgment
for their patients and that shifting that responsibility to patients would be a
"misguided attempt to respect autonomy. "202 Others have argued that such
treatment is also unethical because it misleads patients and their families and
produces false hope, ultimately undermining physician-patient trust.203
Respect for the integrity of the medical profession in this sense provides the
strongest argument for the legal recognition of futility.
Second, treatment can violate the physician's personal ethics. The Pres-
ident's Commission suggested a limited ability of physicians to refuse to
provide treatment because the provision of such treatment would offend the
physician's conscience.' Virginia and Maryland respect the integrity of the
medical profession in this regard through the recent amendments to their
health care decisions acts, which allow a physician to transfer a patient when
the physician disagrees with the patient's treatment decisions. 2" Statutes
addressing a physician's right to refuse to perform abortions provide
examples of responses to ethical conflicts outside of the futility context.'
Respect for physician integrity in this second sense argues most strongly for
transfer provisions when physicians and patients conflict over whether to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
Third, treatment can be unethical if it is not the best use of society's
scarce health care resources. Treatment that is unethical in this sense does
not particularly harm the ethical integrity of the medical profession. How-
202. Paris et al., supra note 119, at 1013. The authors note that "a physician who
merely spreads an array of vendibles in front of the patient [or family] and then says, 'Go
ahead and choose, it's your life,' is guilty of shirking his duty, if not of malpractice." Id.
(quoting Franz J. Ingelfinger, M.D., Arrogance, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1507, 1509 (1980)).
203. See Brody, supra note 170, at 876-77 (describing unethical practice of misleading
patients by falsely raising hopes).
204. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 66, at 3 (stating that "health care
professionals or institutions may decline to provide a particular option because that choice
would violate their conscience or professional judgment, though in doing so they may not
abandon a patient").
205. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing for
transfer of patient by health care provider who refuses to comply with patient's treatment
decision); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2987, -2990 (Michie 1994) (same).
206. See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1274-77 (1993) (discussing legislation in
"vast majority of states" and federal law allowing physicians to refuse to participate in
abortion and offering analogy to futility). Daar notes that the abortion conscience statutes are
generally strong measures: "In no state does the abortion refusal law require or even suggest
that an objecting physician transfer the patient to another physician or facility. At most, the
statute may require that the physician notify the patient of his or her objection." Id. at 1275
n. 151.
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ever, society's response to this social problem could harm the medical pro-
fession's ethical integrity if the response changes the nature of the physi-
cian's role in treatment to include more cost containment.'
In prior decisions involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,
courts have balanced concerns for the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion against respect for patient autonomy. 2°8 One court noted that, when a
willing transferee hospital is available, "[a] patient's right to refuse medical
treatment does not warrant such an unnecessary intrusion upon the hospital's
ethical integrity" as requiring physicians at the transferring hospital to act
contrary to the physicians' ethical principles.' Thus, the court affirmed the
principle that a hospital, and those treating patients there, should not be
forced to act contrary to their ethical principles when their principles are
accepted within a significant portion of the professional community.10
In these cases, physicians generally argued for continued life support
against the patients' wishes to withdraw the treatment - that is, physicians
did not want to withdraw their services - and courts generally held that
concerns for physician ethics could not overcome patient autonomy.211
207. Unethical treatment in this third sense can create two harms, one more particular
and one more general. The particular harm occurs when, for instance, a particular "futile"
treatment is continued on a patient and that patient's bed and other resources are thus kept
from another patient who could clearly benefit more from the care. The more general harm
is to society as a whole resulting from the unjust allocation of the resources other than to their
best uses. For example, some would argue that Helga Wanglie's care was unethical because
society could better use the $800,000 spent on her "futile" care. Rie, supra note 18, at 27
(discussing costs of autonomy). However, this social harm results from a social dilemma,
and society as a whole must resolve the competing interests, rather than particular physicians
resolving them through their treatment of particular patients. Assigning physicians the
responsibility of resolving the allocation problem would fundamentally change the nature of
the physician-patient relationship. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 29 (arguing that
clinicians should not be "society's cost-containment agent").
208. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977) (providing four state interests contrary to patient autonomy, including "main-
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession"); see also Murphy, supra note 201, at
475 n.168 (providing cases acknowledging importance of preserving ethical integrity of
medical profession).
209. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988) (deciding that if
patient cannot be transferred to facility willing to comply with patient's wishes, hospital must
comply); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987) (deciding that competent, terminally ill
woman's right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment outweighed state's interest in preserving
ethical integrity of medical profession); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497
N.E.2d 626, 639-40 (Mass. 1986) (ordering hospital to assist transfer of patient to hospital
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Further, there were generally willing transferee facilities available to comply
with the patients' requests. However, in futility cases, physicians are arguing
for ending life support against patients' wishes to continue the treatment -
that is, physicians do not want to be forced to provide their services - and
generally no facilities have been willing to accept the patients or to comply
with the patients' requests for continued treatment."' Thus, respect for the
ethical integrity of the medical profession and its ability to direct when and
how its services must be used supports the recognition of futility.
2. Respect for Patient Autonomy Does Not Undermine Futility Because
Autonomy Is a Negative Right Instead of a Positive Right
Commentators have noted a distinction between the negative right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment at the end of life, which has been
established by court precedent since the mid-1970s,2"3 and a positive right to
demand specific treatments.2"4 Patient autonomy includes a negative right to
direct that certain treatments not be performed on a patient - it is a right to
refuse treatment and cannot justify a right to demand treatment. 215  The
principal cases in which patient autonomy developed concerned patients'
attempts to withhold or withdraw certain life-sustaining treatments. Those
cases are most properly characterized as concerning the negative right to
prevent certain actions - the provision of unwanted medical treatment -
rather than a positive right to direct certain actions - withdrawal of
willing to comply with patient's request to withdraw treatment); Superintendent of Belcher-
town State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1976) (holding that principle of
patient autonomy prevailed over competing state interests, including maintaining ethical
integrity of medical profession).
212. See supra notes 89, 103 and accompanying text (noting that no transferee facility
could be found in both Wanglie and Baby K). But see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying
text (noting that willing transferee was found in case of Baby L despite transferee's agreement
that care was futile).
213. See supra note 45 (listing leading cases discussing circumstances under which
patient may refuse life-sustaining treatment).
214. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 23 (discussing right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment and right to demand treatment). The authors note that "[a]t least one
obvious difference exists between the cases of Karen Quinlan and Helga Wanglie. Autonomy
gives the patient a right to refuse treatment .... But that principle cannot imply that
autonomy can give the patient or surrogate a right of access to care." Id.
215. Id. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 66, at 44 (stating that "[a]lthough
patients ... have the legal and ethical authority to forego some or all care, this does not
mean that patients may insist on particular treatments").
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216treatment. 6 Indeed, the informed consent doctrine upon which patient
autonomy rests has significance precisely because it allows a patient to decide
that certain treatment is not worth the risks to the individual patient. The
constitutional right of privacy upon which patient autonomy also rests has
significance because it allows individuals to be left alone. Although courts
in some cases have required hospitals to act contrary to the ethical judgment
of the hospitals' physicians outside of the futility context,2 7 those cases are
inapposite because the courts forced action only in the course of enforcing
patients' negative rights to refuse unwanted treatment.28 In sum, the right to
refuse treatment cannot imply a positive right of access to care.21 9
Even if autonomy implies a right of access to care, it may not provide
a legal right to futile care. For example, the American Medical Association
has suggested that physicians may have the authority unilaterally to enter Do
Not Resuscitate orders when CPR would be futile.' In a case establishing
216. See Murphy, supra note 201, at 477-79 (discussing precedent for patient autonomy
and finding nothing to support order directing physician to provide treatment against medical
and ethical judgments).
217. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 590-91 (D.R.I. 1988) (concluding that if
patient cannot be transferred to facility willing to comply with patient's wishes, hospital must
comply); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987) (concluding that nursing home could not
refuse to participate in patient's withdrawal of artificial nutrition by continuing to treat patient
until patient was transferred); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886, 891-93 (N.J. Ch.) (determining
that right of patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment superseded hospital's policy against with-
holding food and water from patients and denying hospital's request to compel patient to leave),
47td, 517 A.2d 869. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (Ct. App. 1986) (Compton, J., concurring) (suggesting that right to die
includes positive right to enlist aid of others "in making death as painless and quick as
possible").
218. See Murphy, supra note 201, at 474 n.164 (distinguishing circumstances involved in
Gray, Jobes, and Requena cases from situations involving positive right to demand treatment).
219. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 23 (discussing autonomy and right of access
to treatment); see also Murphy, supra note 201, at 477-79 (discussing autonomy as negative
right). Murphy concludes:
Autonomy is limited by the reach of the legal roots that established it: the
constitutional right to privacy; the common law doctrine of informed consent; and the
common law right to be free from unwanted or nonconsensual bodily invasion. Each
is a negative right, from which no entitlement to medical care properly can be
inferred.
Id. at 479.
220. See generally Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Medical Ass'n, Guidelines
for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868 (1991) (presenting
guidelines). The Council stated that "[a] physician is not ethically obligated to make a specific
diagnosis or therapeutic procedure available to a patient, even on specific request, if the use of
such a procedure would be futile." Id. at 1870. CPR is futile if it "cannot be expected either
838
MEDICAL FUTILrTY: A FUTILE CONCEPT?
that a physician's intentional withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment pursuant
to a family request will not create criminal liability, the California Supreme
Court noted in dicta that a physician has no duty to continue providing
ineffective treatment." The court characterized ineffective treatment as
treatment that "cannot and does not improve the prognosis for recovery. "I
A therapeutic privilege to withhold information from a patient that sound
medical judgment suggests would potentially harm a patient diminishes the
patient's right to refuse treatment by limiting disclosure to the patient under
informed consent principles. m Because courts limit disclosure requirements
under the doctrine of informed consent, they should also limit the derivative
right to refuse treatment.
to restore cardiac or respiratory function to the patient or to achieve the expressed goals of the
informed patient." Id. at 1871. But see N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2978 (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 1996) (establishing presumption of consent to CPR, establishing procedures for
issuing DNR orders, and requiring consent for issuance of DNR order).
221. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
doctor's cessation of life-sustaining treatment upon family's request, though intentional and with
knowledge that patient would die, was not unlawful failure to perform legal duty). The court
noted in dicta:
A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved to be
ineffective. Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the
immediate aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use
once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel.
"A physician is authorized under the standards of medical practice to discontinue
a form of therapy which in his medical judgment is useless . . . . If the treating
physicians have determined that continued use of a respirator is useless, then they may
decide to discontinue it without fear of civil or criminal liability. By useless is meant
that the continued use of the therapy cannot and does not improve the prognosis for
recovery."
Id. at 491 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dennis Horan, Euthanasia and Brain Death: Ethical
and Legal Considerations, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 363, 367 (1978)).
222. Id. (quoting Dennis Horan, Euthanasia and Brain Death: Ethical and Legal
Considerations, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 363, 367 (1978)). However, the court finally
concluded that the patient should be the ultimate decisionmaker:
Given the general standards for determining when there is a duty to provide
medical treatment of debatable value, the question still remains as to who should make
these vital decisions. Clearly, the medical diagnoses and prognoses must be
determined by the treating and consulting physicians under the generally accepted
standards of medical practice in the community and, whenever possible, the patient
himself should then be the ultimate decision-maker.
Id. at 492.
223. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing limited
therapeutic privilege of physician), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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3. Potential Limits to Physician Authority to Declare Treatment Futile
Despite the argument that patient autonomy does not undermine a physi-
cian's authority to declare treatment futile as a matter of fact, patient auton-
omy is obviously the primary limit to potential physician authority to declare
treatment futile 24 Over the last twenty years, courts have firmly established
the right of self-determination as a fundamental principle in the context of
end-of-life decisionmaking. More recently, legislatures have protected that
right through the passage of living will and surrogate decisionmaking
statutes.2-6
The state interest in the preservation of life is the primary factor under-
lying end-of-life cases. 7 The presumption in favor of life limits a physi-
cian's authority to declare that certain life-sustaining treatment is futile. In
support of this presumption, the Supreme Court has noted the irreversibility
of an erroneous decision to terminate life.m The presumption should carry
even more weight when a patient's preference for continued treatment aligns
with the presumption in favor of life.
Several federal statutes may also limit a physician's authority to declare
treatment futile. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits dis-
crimination by programs receiving federal funds against "otherwise quali-
fied" handicapped individuals, based solely upon the individual's handi-
cap.29 At least one federal court has concluded that withholding allegedly
futile treatment would violate the Rehabilitation Act." The same federal
court also considered whether withholding allegedly futile treatment would
violate the public accommodations provision of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act. 3 The court noted that because the claim of futility in Baby K
rested on the infant's condition of anencephaly, the provider was denying the
224. See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text (discussing patient autonomy).
225. See supra note 45 (listing leading cases that discuss patient refusal of life-sustaining
treatment).
226. See Mordarski, supra note 11, at 778 (noting that every state and District of
Columbia have legislation concerning an individual's right to accept or reject life-sustaining
treatments and establishing procedures for surrogate decisionmakers); id. at 778 n.197
(compiling list of relevant state statutes).
227. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing respect for life as
important factor in end-of-life cases).
228. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
230. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027-28 (E.D. Va. 1993), aft'd, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12182 (1994).
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infant life-sustaining treatment based upon the infant's disability."3z Thus,
withholding the allegedly futile treatment would violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act.3 Also, as the Fourth Circuit held in Baby K, the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) may preempt
statutory authority allowing for a determination of futility.' Although the
application of EMTALA is unclear and preemption will depend upon the
facts of a given case, any situation in which a physician deems treatment to
be futile could, as a practical matter, fit within the statute's broad definition
of "emergency condition" and trigger treatment obligations."
Finally, the California Court of Appeal has presented the possibility of
a collective responsibility among health care providers to share the burden
of difficult cases3 6 One commentator has suggested that the medical com-
munity may have a similar obligation, stemming from physicians' monopoly
privilege to practice medicine, to provide allegedly futile treatment that a
patient nonetheless thinks provides a benefit and that this obligation will
continue to exist at least until a social consensus about futile treatment devel-
ops.37 Such an obligation would seriously undermine physicians' authority
to declare a legal right not to provide "futile" treatment because the profes-
sion as a whole would be required to provide any treatment for which a
patient perceived a benefit.
D. Policy Considerations
Policy considerations that support a physician's right to declare certain
treatment futile begin with an examination of the physician's role. Physi-
232. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
233. Id.
234. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994)
(determining that EMTALA preempts VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994) and
requires hospital to treat anencephalic infant); see also supra note 108 (discussing Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Baby K.
235. Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, by definition of the treatment being "life-
sustaining," creates a condition "manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
... such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to
result in - (i) placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious
impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part .... "
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (1994).
236. See Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230 (Ct. App. 1982) (discussing
possibility of collective responsibility among health care providers to share burden of difficult
patients, but finding record inadequate to support relief on that ground as matter of law).
237. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 149, at 26-28 (arguing that professional duty
requires treatment as condition of monopoly privilege).
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cians are specially trained to recognize and react to medical phenomena.
Society and individuals entrust physicians with judgments about appropriate
treatments based upon the physicians' special knowledge and training. Both
because physicians are better informed than lay people regarding the medical
facts of a given case and because physicians have a personal ethical stake in
how their skills are used, physicians arguably should have at least limited
authority to declare that certain treatments at the extremes of life are not
within the scope of their obligations and to refuse to provide those treat-
ments. A patient's right to autonomous self-determination does not necessar-
ily conflict with the physician's authority. The patient's right is a negative
right to decline particular treatments. If a physician's professional integrity
has any meaning, a patient cannot possess a positive right to direct the use
of the professional's skills toward any and all ends chosen by the patient."
Further, cost limitations and the equitable distribution of scarce health care
resources require additional limitations on patient autonomy. 2 9
Policy considerations that undermine the recognition of a physician's
authority to declare certain treatments futile begin with the patient. Over the
last twenty years, courts have recognized the right of a patient to determine
when to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, even when doing so means that
the patient will die.2' Recognizing futility as a legal concept would seri-
ously undermine patients' rights. Futility, in effect, would grant physicians
the authority to declare that certain individuals should die and would repre-
sent a serious devaluation of life through the removal of the presumption in
238. See Brody, supra note 170, at 877 (stating that "professional integrity is of little
consequence" if all patients desire is "advice from some scientifically informed person
about which manipulations will or will not produce certain biological results").
239. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 429 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J., dissent-
ing) (raising economic issue in decisions regarding use of life-sustaining treatment), aff'd
sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Judge Blackmar
stated:
The absolutist position is also infirm because the state does not stand
prepared to finance the preservation of life, without regard to the cost, in very
many cases. In this particular case the state has Nancy in its possession, and is
litigating its right to keep her. Yet, several years ago, a respected judge needed
extraordinary treatment which the hospital in which he was a patient was not
willing to furnish without a huge advance deposit, and the state apparently had
no desire to help out. Many people die because of the unavailability of heroic
medical treatment. It simply cannot be said that the state's interest in preserving
and prolonging life is absolute.
Id. (citations omitted).
240. See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text (discussing patient autonomy and
right to direct use or nonuse of life-prolonging treatment).
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favor of life that has limited patients' authority to remove life-sustaining
treatment.24' Moreover, although the cost of life-sustaining treatment
relative to the benefit that such treatment generates is an important consider-
ation, society should weigh the costs and benefits, and should not entrust that
analysis to physicians. The law should be particularly concerned about
granting physicians such authority given the growing use of managed care
systems that provide economic incentives to limit care, which can affect an
already-complicated judgment about the appropriate use of life-sustaining
treatments at the edges of life.242
V. Recommendations for How the Legal System Should Respond
The legal system should reject a general recognition of qualitative
futility that would allow physicians unilaterally to decide the benefits of
treatments, to declare that certain treatments are futile, and to refuse to
provide certain treatments despite the expressed contrary wishes of a patient
or surrogate. Case law does not support a broad qualitative futility concept.
241. For example, the Cruzan Court concluded that a state could require a clear and
convincing standard of proof that a now-incompetent patient would have wanted life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn before a surrogate's instructions to withdraw the treatment
must be honored. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-84 (1990).
Thus, the presumption in favor of life limits a patient's authority to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment.
242. See Lantos, supra note 17, at 869 (noting increasing susceptibility of doctors in
managed care networks to financial conflicts of interest among patient loyalty, social respon-
sibility, and organizational loyalty). Under managed care systems and capitated fee sched-
ules, providers are paid "up front" to provide health services to subscribers. Providers under
these systems do not receive additional money for additional services when a patient becomes
sick, as under the traditional fee-for-service arrangement. Thus, there exists an economic
incentive to limit care for patients whose care is very expensive, particularly for cases in
which the perceived benefits of the care are low. By definition, the benefits of treatment are
low or nonexistent for cases in which physicians determine that care is futile. Physicians
working for managed care providers "find themselves between a rock and a hard place."
Kolata, supra note 15, at B8 (quoting Father John J. Paris, ethicist at Boston College and
Jesuit priest). That is, managed care physicians' expenses on behalf of patients are moni-
tored, and the physicians must either deny futile care and risk suit by the patient's family or
provide the futile care and risk being dismissed for providing needless and expensive
treatment. Id. For further discussion of this issue, see Ellen Fox & Carol Stocking, Ethics
Consultants' Recommendations for Life-Prolonging Treatment of Patients in a Persistent
Vegetative State, 270 JAMA 2578, 2581 (1993) (finding concern for appropriate resource
allocation "evidently influenced" respondent ethical consultant's choices as to recommenda-
tions for intensity of treatment for hypothetical patients in persistent vegetative state) and
Pelligrino, supra note 25, at 203 (discussing importance of futility debate in era of changing
fiduciary relationship).
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Broad qualitative futility poses potential problems to the gains in patient
autonomy that courts have developed in the past several years. Broad
qualitative futility may also conflict with several federal statutes - the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
EMTALA - through which Congress has sought to protect particular
populations that are acutely susceptible to having their medical treatments
labeled futile. Further, even if certain treatments are truly futile for the
patient, they may offer value to the patient's family if continued for a
reasonable period of time. 43 Assuming that most patients would appreciate
an opportunity to help their families, continuing futile treatment under such
circumstances does not conflict with a patient's best interests and imposes only
a marginal burden on a physician's ethics and integrity. As discussed previ-
ously, the noncontroversial concept of quantitative futility adds little toward
the resolution of the true futility debate concerning the benefits resulting from
certain treatments. 244
Rather than focusing entirely on futility - a concept that establishes
physicians and patients as adversaries - the law should instead promote dis-
cussion between patients and families and among patients, their families, and
physicians.245 Some evidence suggests that surrogates do not accurately pre-
dict patients' wishes in given scenarios unless the patient and surrogate have
discussed the particular situation. ' The evidence also suggests that patients
and surrogates do not request allegedly futile treatments when physicians
frankly and honestly present all of the facts surrounding the patient's progno-
sis.247  Rather, communication generally produces agreement. 2  Further,
243. See Loewy & Carlson, supra note 16, at 429-30 (noting that treatment may be futile
for patient but have social value for family and approving of extending treatment for reason-
able time to allow family and others concerned to come to terms with situation, provided
treatment causes patient no suffering).
244. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing quantitative futility
concept's lack of usefulness).
245. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206,
4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115, 1388-204 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w)
(1994) (requiring health providers to provide written information to patients regarding their
rights under state law to accept or reject medical care and to make advance directives and
informing patients of facility's policies regarding use of life-sustaining treatment) (commonly
known as the Patient Self-Determination Act). The Patient Self-Determination Act is one
such legislative response that promotes conversation.
246. See Suhl et al., supra note 5, at 93-95 (finding disagreement between patients'
responses to questionnaire for preferences for life support treatment in four scenarios and
substituted judgment of patients' surrogates).
247. See Teno et al., supra note 5, at 1205-06 (suggesting that physicians and surrogates
already acknowledge futility of some treatments). But see SUPPORT, supra note 64, at 1596
MEDICAL FUTILITY A FUTLE CONCEPT?
many futile conditions develop over time,249 which allows for discussion
between physicians and surrogates in those cases.
If communication cannot produce agreement, the law should respect the
professional judgment and ethical rights of physicians who disagree with
patients' requests for continued treatment and should allow such physicians to
withdraw treatment after arranging for transfer of their patients.' The
Virginia and Maryland health care decisions acts respond to this concern by
providing for transfer of the patient when physicians determine that requested
treatment is inappropriate." The MD-HCDA addresses the transfer option
more comprehensively by explicitly stating a duty to comply with treatment
requests pending transfer when failure to do so would likely result in the
patient's death.'
However, transferring a patient is not always an available option. As a
practical matter, many facilities will refuse to accept these complicated
(finding that enhanced opportunities for physician-patient communication did not change
established physician practice patterns that included major shortcomings in care of seriously
ill, hospitalized patients).
248. See Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 886 (suggesting that physicians' fear of legal
liability may underlie "unreasonable" concerns about treatment that are currently fueling
futility debate). Schneiderman also states that "[p]atients and families who demand that
'everything be done' may well be expressing a subtext: 'Do not abandon me.'" Id. Thus,
improved communication and an "ethic of care" may provide the best solution. See generally
Schneiderman et al., supra note 164 (arguing for ethic of care). However, such an "ethic of
care" may do little to produce agreement that treatment is futile for patients who request
extended treatment on religious grounds because conversations between physicians, patients,
and families are not likely to change religious convictions. To the extent that such convic-
tions play a part in patients' requests for allegedly futile treatments, they may result in a
futility impasse such as in the Baby K and Baby Rena cases. See Tousignant & Miller, supra
note 96, at A9 (reporting mother's religious convictions and belief that Baby K will one day
be normal despite anencephalic condition); Weiser, supra note 127, pt. 2, at A6 (describing
foster father's discussion of religious views with Baby Rena's physicians).
249. See Paris, et al, supra note 180 (presenting case in which parents changed treatment
goals for their ill son - from restoring pulmonary function to "simply keeping their son
alive" - which raised questions regarding futility and obligations to continue treatment
"beyond its intended function").
250. See Daar, supra note 206, at 1280-88 (advocating adaptation of ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct standards for lawyer withdrawal from representing certain clients to
medical futility question and establishment of in-hospital Treatment Evaluation Boards to hear
and resolve disputes and to arrange for transfer in cases of impasse); Murphy, supra note
201, at 483-84 (advocating transfer of patients to resolve futility impasses); Paris et al., supra
note 119, at 1013-14 (describing transfer that resolved futility debate in case of Baby L).
251. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613 (1994 & Supp. 1995); VA CODE ANN.
§§ 54.1-2987, -2990 (Michie 1994).
252. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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cases. 3 Thus, the transfer option, by itself, is an incomplete solution to the
problem of medical futility. The Virginia and Maryland health care decision
acts are similarly incomplete, as neither addresses the situation in which no
willing transferee facility is available.
The refusal of all available medical providers to consider providing
allegedly futile treatment may signal a medical consensus that such treatment
truly is futile.? Perhaps the law should allow courts, on a case-by-case basis,
to uphold physicians' determinations of futility to override patients' requests
for treatment in limited instances, such as when an impasse occurs and no
transferee facility is available. The medical facts of given cases are too
important and too varied to allow for a more general determination. Before
such a determination is upheld, however, the law should require physicians
to show, by at least clear and convincing evidence z 5 that (1) the burdens of
the, treatment substantially outweigh the benefits to the patient? 6 or that the
treatment constitutes abuse and neglect,2 7 and (2) the provision of the re-
quested treatment under the circumstances lies substantially outside of any
standard of care, including any respectable minority view. Requiring such a
showing protects patient autonomy and patients' interests in determining the
253. For example, the Wanglie and Baby K cases both involved unsuccessful transfer
attempts prior to the ultimate judicial resolutions. See supra notes 77-92, 98-108 and
accompanying text (discussing these cases).
254. See Murphy, supra note 201, at 484 (noting that unavailability of transferee
demonstrates consensus that confirms original determination of futility) (quoting MARGOT L.
WHITE, VIRGINIA'S HEALTH CARE DECISIONS AcT OF 1992, at 3 (1992) (on file at The
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy)).
255. The Cruzan Court noted that many courts require a clear and convincing evidence
standard in cases determining whether to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from
persons in persistent vegetative states. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261,284 (1990) (noting other courts' use of clear and convincing standard in substituted
judgment situations).
256. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985) (describing pure-objective
test). The Conroy court noted:
In the absence of trustworthy evidence ... that the patient would have
declined the treatment, life-sustaining treatment may still be withheld or withdrawn
[if] the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment ... clearly and
markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life. Further, the
recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment should
be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane.
Id.
257. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (providing that "[a]t the very least, the Hospital
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. H's treatment decision should not
be respected because it would constitute abuse or neglect of Baby K").
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benefits of treatments for themselves, rather than having physicians determine
those benefits for their patients. This would represent the recognition of a
limited qualitative concept of futility. 8
The refusal of all practically available alternative treatment providers to
provide requested treatment could serve as evidence that the requested treat-
ment lies far outside of any standard of care. Courts should closely scrutinize
this "consensus," expressed through the absence of a willing transferee facil-
ity, that treatment is futile because such absence could result from economic
concerns or other concerns unrelated to the medical futility of the requested
treatment. However, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and EMTALA may still prevent a court from upholding a physician's
determination of futility. Thus, to allow for the strictly limited authority to
declare life-sustaining treatment futile under these circumstances, Congress
should amend the conflicting federal statutes to allow for the futility determi-
nation.
Finally, society must confront the social problems surrounding the futility
debate. Physicians, patients, and policymakers must discuss the goals and
purposes of medicine in our society, or managed care plans will make these
important decisions unilaterally 759 Members of society will necessarily con-
front questions concerning the meaning that we attach to life, particularly
"profoundly diminished life."I Society must also discuss the economic
questions that futility presents concerning payment for costly treatments at the
extremes of life, the equitable allocation of scarce health care resources, and
the benefits to society of providing and paying for such treatments."
VI. Conclusion
The time has come for the law to address the question of medical futility
and whether a physician can refuse to provide life-sustaining treatment that the
physician deems medically inappropriate or futile despite the patient's request
that the treatment continue. Respect for the ethical integrity of the medical
profession requires some recognition of futility. A recognition that patient
258. See supra notes 169-87 (discussing qualitative futility).
259. See Michael Lasalandra, Experts Predict Future Docs Will Have Final Say on
Dying, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 4, 1995, at 17 (commenting on Gilgunn case, described supra
note 15, and reporting opinion of medical ethics experts that society will not discuss limits
of health care, leaving individual managed care plans to develop protocols and to make
decisions concerning treatment at end of life).
260. The term is borrowed from Morreim, supra note 8.
261. See generally Callahan, supra note 26 (noting that economic scarcity requires
setting some limits on patient's ability to define care given).
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autonomy creates a negative right to refuse treatment instead of a positive
right to demand treatment allows some room for physicians to determine that
:certain care is futile. Yet patient autonomy, a respect for life, and a concern
for "erring on the side of life" require limits to a physician's authority to
declare treatment futile. Allowing for a transfer option when patients and
physicians disagree about the utility or futility of treatment is an important
first step in respecting both patient autonomy and physician ethical integrity.
The next step is for courts to recognize, on a case-by-case basis, a physician's
authority to declare treatment futile when clear evidence supports the consen-
sus determination of all available physicians that the treatment is futile, and
for society to begin discussing the broader effects of the futility debate.
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